Paper Example on the Gas Explosion Case

The primary cause for the gas explosion was a defect in the valve that caused an opening. After the removal of the safety plug from the valve, propane escaped through the hole created by the defect. Typically, a technician should always look out for defects in the valve that might indicate the likelihood of a leakage. However, lack of training for the employee on duty that day led to the failure to check for defects that might have pointed the escape of propane. In addition, lack of training for the first responders and the absence of propane emergency guide for the 911 operators increased the magnitude of the explosion. Findings of the investigation by CBS revealed that there was an interval of thirty minutes between when the gas started leaking and the explosion (United States Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, 2008, p. 39). This suggests that if evacuation was initiated at the onset of the leakage, all the lives would have been saved.

Also, the 911 operators failed to give directives for evacuation despite the severity of the incident. In fact, four employees remained inside after closing the store instead of moving out. It was only after the arrival of a fire captain that the order to evacuate was given. However, the gas exploded before they could act. The failure by the responders to issue evacuation directives indicates that they had inadequate training hence they could not recognize its urgency. Perhaps, this is to blame for the training course of West Virginia fire fighters. Although the program equips the firefighters with skills of how to respond to hazardous substances, it does not provide refresher courses. In fact, the first responder on the scene had received training in 1998 (ten years before the accident) (United States Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, 2008, p. 38). As a result, they lacked up to date knowledge that would helped them realize the need for immediate evacuation.

The proximity of the gas tank to the building was a risk factor to the explosion. After the investigations, it was established that the tank was close to the wall since installation by the supplier in 1994. That was contrary to the OSHA regulations and the fire code of West Virginia, which stipulate that tanks with a capacity of 500 gallons should be put not less than ten feet from a building wall. The short distance between the wall and tank enabled the gas released from the valve to enter the store through overhanging pipes directly above it. Once in the piping system, propane diffused through the ceiling and ventilation ducts that spread it across the building. Although the service personnel maintained the tank for many years, they were cognizant that the installation violated the state laws, but they never reported the mistake to their superiors. Rather, they believed that the tank placement had been authorized possibly under unique considerations.

References

United States Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board. (2008). Little General Store propane explosion: (four killed, six injured) (2007-04-I-WV).